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The paper examines the relationship between supplier network organization and
regional economic development.  A distinctive feature of the German economy is the
existence of a large and productive base of small and medium companies,
commonly called the Mittelstand.  Chambers of Commerce, trade associations, local
research institutes and other para-public institutions provide a public infrastructure
helping groups of Mittelstand companies develop research and development, quality
control, training and other important competencies that they are too small to invest in
individually.  The paper argues that sophisticated firms must also engage these
institutions if they are to function.  Case studies of the newest East German car
production networks show that final assemblers are creating supplier chains with
minimal technical collaboration with local suppliers and the delegation rather than
sharing of contracting risks. As a result, few sophisticated companies are engaging
local para-public institutions, with negative consequences for the development of
local  Mittelstand companies in the two regions.
Zusammenfassung
In dem Papier werden die Beziehungen zwischen den organisatorischen Strukturen
der Zulieferer-Netzwerke und der regionalen Wirtschaftsentwicklung untersucht. Ein
typisches Element der deutschen Volkswirtschaft ist die Existenz einer
weitgefächerten und produktiven Basis kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen,
gemeinhin als Mittelstand bezeichnet. Industrie- und Handelskammern,
Wirtschaftsverbände, lokale Forschungsinstitute und andere para-staatliche
Institutionen bilden eine öffentliche  Infrastruktur, die den mittelständischen
Unternehmen hilft, Forschung und Entwicklung,  Qualitätskontrollen sowie
Ausbildungskapazitäten aufzubauen und andere wichtige Kompetenzen zu
entwickeln, in die zu investieren sie alleine zu klein wären.
In dem Diskussionspapier wird die Meinung vertreten, daß „aufgeweckte“
Unternehmen sich aber auch dieser Institutionen bedienen müssen, sollen sie
funktionieren.  Fallstudien der erst kürzlich aufgebauten Produktionsnetzwerke von
Autoherstellern in Ostdeutschland zeigen, daß die Endhersteller Zuliefererketten
aufbauen, die nur in geringem Umfang mit den lokalen Zuliefereren technisch
kooperieren. Außerdem versuchen die Endhersteller, Vertragsrisiken abzuwälzen
statt sie gemeinsam mit den Zulieferern zu übernehmen. Als Ergebnis kann
festgestellt werden, daß nur einige „clevere“ Unternehmen diese lokalen und
regionalen para-staatlichen Institutionen nutzen. Dies hat negative Konsequenzen
für die Entwicklung der lokalen und regionalen mittelständischen Unternehmen in
den beiden untersuchten Regionen  Sachsen und Thüringen.Table of Contents
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1. Introduction
Between 1989 and 1990 Volkswagen and Opel, two of Germany’s largest car
manufacturers, set up shop in the former East Germany.
 1  In both cases, fully
integrated East German car manufacturing conglomerates, or Kombinate, were
broken into parts and privatized to VW, Opel, and numerous supplier
companies.   Volkswagen took over the Sachsen Ring conglomerate located in
Zwickau, Saxony, while Opel took over the Wartburg conglomerate in Eisenach,
Thuringen.  Other parts of each plant were privatized to supplier companies.
Most of the more sophisticated component products, such as seats or axles,
became subsidiaries of West German or in some cases American suppliers.
But dozens of independently owned firms were also founded by West German
entrepreneurs and managers of the old East German plants.  Within a year,
both VW and Opel had set up fully operational car assembly operations.
By late 1995 the tumultuous process of rationalizing the organization of
work and carrying out massive new capital investments within both regions had
largely been accomplished.   Employment has stabilized and most plant
upgrading investments are complete.  Both Opel and VW are producing
successful lower market segment models at very high levels of quality.  Since
both firms rely on supplied parts for some 70% of value added, this high level of
quality reflects not just two isolated plants, but the creation of a broader network
of high quality parts suppliers.
Both Opel and Volkswagen are using new decentralized production
concepts in East Germany.  Decentralized production entails the construction of
supplier networks in which final assemblers outsource the manufacture and
design of entire components to a new class of companies called “system
suppliers.”  In addition, tighter information links facilitate the ordering of a
variety of component configurations in a very short time period.  These orders
are then synchronized with final assembly and delivered by way of “just-in-time”
(JIT) logistical systems that supply parts directly to the final assembler’s
production lines.
This paper examines patterns of supplier network organization adopted in
Eisenach and Zwickau by Opel and VW.  From this analysis, the paper
identifies several challenges presented by the new forms of supplier network
                                                          
1 I am grateful to Bob Hancké, Isabela Mares, David Soskice, and Sigurt Vitols for helpful
suggestions.  I also thank the U.S. National Science Foundation for financial support and the
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin for institutional support.  This paper is forthcoming in a special
issue of the Journal of Industry Studies on Modell Deutschland in the 1990s.2
organization to the “German model” of economic organization.  Compared to
the U.S., France or UK, Germany has a large and productive base of small and
medium sized, or Mittelstand firms (Acs and Audretsch 1993; Vitols 1995).  An
important part of the German Model is the existence of what Katzenstein (1989)
calls “para-public institutions” such as Chambers of Commerce, trade
associations, cooperative savings banks, and research institutions.    Para-
public institutions provide a public infrastructure helping groups of Mittelstand
companies develop research and development, quality control, training and
other important competencies that they are too small to invest in individually.
The literature on decentralized production arrangements has examined in
detail one particular constellation of technical arrangements and related
governance structures that has been labeled “collaborative manufacturing”
(Sabel 1995).  This paradigm of industrial organization combines intense and
long-term technical collaboration between firms in the production chain with the
pooling of most legal and contractual risks through informal governance
arrangements.  The paper argues that there is a direct link between this
paradigm of decentralized production and the success of German para-public
institutions in providing resources to Mittelstand firms.  Some of the most
acclaimed aspects of this framework, in particular the system of pooled
research and development projects, is predicated upon companies collectively
engaging para-public institutions.
Supplier network organization in both Eisenach and Zwickau does not
conform to the collaborative manufacturing model.  While basic organizational
principles underlying the new supplier network concepts have been maintained,
the relationships between final assemblers and suppliers within both regions is
characterized by a lack of deliberative or cooperative technical relationships
between companies, the delegation of most legal and market risks to particular
firms through formal legal arrangements, and the immersion of important firms
within private corporate networks on the national level rather than within local
networks with other firms.
The paper argues that this alternative model of decentralized production
creates a series of obstacles for small and medium sized independent firms.
Both the Eisenach and Zwickau regional economies are populated by a pool of
both independent suppliers and numerous branch plants of sophisticated “full
service” supplier companies from West Germany and the United States.   Even
though the individual plants of the full-service suppliers are very similar to those
of the independent firms in Zwickau and Eisenach, the full-service plants
benefit from access to valuable technical assistance and financial resources
from internal corporate networks that do not exist for the independent firms.
Local para-public institutions in Zwickau and Eisenach are not developing
important technical competencies needed by small firms largely because “full
service” suppliers are not engaging these institutions.3
The organization of the paper is as follows.  The next section examines the
“collaborative manufacturing” paradigm and shows how its principles are ideally
suited to the creation of robust para-public institutions within German regional
economies.   The third section provides a detailed examination of decentralized
production as implemented by Opel and Volkswagen in East Germany.  Both
firms have used an alternative decentralized production paradigm centered
around “module production”.  The fourth section examines in detail the
governance structures created by VW and Opel to support long term flexible
price clauses and JIT delivery. These governance structures encompass both
the organization of technical arrangements developed between Opel and VW
and their suppliers but also the strategies used to manage important market
and legal risks created by the new supplier network concepts.
The fifth section of the paper examines the challenge to small firms created
by these arrangements and argues that local para-public institutions are
unlikely to develop the necessary competencies to help them.  To exemplify this
point, this section examines the introduction of quality management systems, a
new firm competency made critical by JIT delivery.  Though German para-
public institutions have in the past created similar competencies in other areas,
supplier network architecture in both Zwickau and Eisenach has so far
prevented the necessary coalition of interested firms from emerging.  This is
followed by a conclusion.
2.  The collaborative manufacturing paradigm
Car companies across the world are rapidly downsizing through outsourcing the
production and design of many critical subassemblies to supplier firms.
Through subcontracting the production of seats, brake systems, and a variety
of other discrete subassemblies relying on micro-electronic, chemical or other
technologies to specialist suppliers, car manufacturers can concentrate on their
core competencies of engine design and final assembly.  Furthermore, the use
of flexible procurement systems and JIT delivery schemes increases product
variety, allows the creation of more sophisticated marketing and distribution
systems (Asanuma 1993), reduces inventory costs, and improves quality
control (Schonberger 1982).
One of the first and most prominent examples of a company creating
decentralized production networks is the German high-end car producer BMW
(Herrigel and Sabel 1994; Casper 1996).  BMW is noted for benefiting from
highly collaborative inter-firm relationships. For example, a recent report on
Japanese joint product development noted that Toyota, a world-leader in the
field, sets up full-scale collaborative engineering teams from the conceptual4
stage of product design onwards with only “a handful” of key supplies (Kamath
and Liker 1994: 156).  BMW’s goal is to conduct full-scale joint product
development with suppliers responsible for each of 40 to 50 basic system
components or subassemblies it has identified in all models; it has currently
developed the organizational infrastructure to do this with about 30 suppliers for
each of its three basic model platforms (Meissner et al. 1994: 69; BMW 1992:
11).
Based on case studies of BMW and many other firms in other industries,
both in Germany and elsewhere, many scholars have associated decentralized
production with the creation of what Charles Sabel calls “collaborative
manufacturing.” (Sabel 1995)  Volatile world market and accelerated
technological change, these authors argue, lessens market power and scale
economy advantages held by giant vertically integrated firms. Successful
companies today are instead specializing in a limited number of core activities
and then creating numerous long-term technical partnerships with other firms.
This allows scope economies created through extensive cooperation over
product design, quality control, and logistics to be shared across firms in the
production network.
Decentralized production creates numerous legal and market risks that final
assemblers and suppliers must create governance structures to cope with.
Companies using collaborative manufacturing relationships creates incentives
to create governance structures that pool or share risks.  This is sometimes
necessary because technical relationships blur traditional boundaries between
firms, making it difficult to write legally binding contracts delegating legal risks to
one firm or the other.  This is clearest in joint product development.  In the car
industry, unforeseen interaction effects between subassemblies produced by
suppliers and the rest of the car can create substantial re-engineering costs
and if not found in testing, create expensive product recalls or product liability
lawsuits (Casper 1995).  When engineers from the final assembler and supplier
jointly collaborate for several months on a design, responsibility in fact is
usually shared.   In such cases collaborative product development relationships
are only possible if firms agree to share risks and settle internal disputes over
liability for mistakes privately.
Even when risks could be delegated entirely to one of the manufacturing
partners, risk sharing is important to sustain close technical ties.  Sabel has
argued that firms then use ongoing technical relationships to closely examine
each other’s activities and through doing so satisfy themselves that partners are
living up to their obligations.  “Learning by monitoring” is the concept Sabel
uses to describe how firms capture gains from collaboration while at the same
time assuring themselves that partners are not skimping on their responsibilities
(Sabel 1993).5
The important point here is that the way firms manage risks strongly
influences the organization of technical collaboration.  Simply put, when
business risks are shared across firms, there is a much stronger incentive for
companies to work together to alleviate problems than in cases when business
risks are delegated entirely to one firm or another.  In other areas of the
supplier relationship, such as creating JIT logistical systems or negotiating long-
term pricing agreements, it is often possible to write legally enforceable
contracting delegating most legal and market risks entirely to one firm.
However, case studies of BMW and other firms using collaborative
manufacturing concepts show that risk sharing and monitoring through intense
technical collaboration is also used in these areas (Casper 1995).
This argument can be taken one step further.  Companies entering
collaborative relationships can do so in a number of ways.  All aspects of the
relationship, both the governance structure used to share risks and the
organization of technical relationships, can be privately developed by the firms.
But they can also be embedded within para-public institutions contained within
a regional economy. It is here that the type of governance structures used by
firms directly influence the viability of para-public institutions.  There is an
enormous literature examining the role of Chambers of Commerce, trade
associations, technical institutes, and other local bodies providing support for
small and medium sized firms in Germany (see Katzenstein 1989 for an
overview).  While these institutions often help individual firms, the most
important strand of this literature argues that these institutions provide an
infrastructure or companies seeking to pool resources (Herrigel, 1993).
But what is clear is that firms must be engaging in collaborative
manufacturing relationships for this to work.  If firms are not pooling risks they
usually do not engage in intensive technical collaboration.  If not,  there is little
chance that they will collectively engage the local para-public institutions that
are crucial for the German model to perform.  This is the case in both Eisenach
and Zwickau.  In both regions final assemblers have found other ways to
organize supplier relationships that avoid both risk pooling and intensive
technical collaboration.  Partially as a result, vibrant para-public institutions are
not developing in either locality.  This has hampered the development of a
strong supplier base of independent Mittelstand firms in  both regions.
3. Another strategy for decentralized production: Opel and
VW’s New East German production networks
One might expect that Volkswagen and Opel would attempt to follow the lead of
their highly successful upper-market competitor BMW and use collaborative6
manufacturing principles when setting up their new supplier networks.
2  Both
firms could essentially start from scratch in building their East German supplier
bases.  Volkswagen’s early announcements that they would use their East
German development as an “experiment” in developing new supplier network
concepts based on extensive outsourcing to JIT producers sounded very
promising (Meissner et al. 1994:51-55).  The Opel-Eisenach plant was explicitly
set up to introduce Japanese “lean production” concepts into Germany
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1994).  Since cooperation with system
suppliers forms a core component of the Japanese production system, it was
fair to assume that Opel would introduce similar concepts when organizing
supplier relationships in Eisenach.
VW and Opel have created sophisticated supplier networks in East
Germany,   but have constructed them along a different organizational logic of
industrial organization.  Both VW and Opel organized their new plants around a
supplier strategy centered on the incorporation of discrete component modules
that are independently designed by suppliers.  The module strategy can lead to
suboptimal engineering performance, since long-term joint product
development relationships with suppliers are not created.  Instead, final
assemblers present suppliers with desired performance characteristics,
physical descriptions, and attachment points and then leave the further design
and production of the component completely to the supplier.   Many volume
market assemblers prefer it because it is much cheaper to implement, does not
require the development of long-term relationships with particular suppliers, and
does lead to some product market flexibility (Asanuma 1993; Ulrich 1994).
The module production system requires the investment of fewer product
development resources in collaborative relationships.  Development resources
are typically used instead to pursue more radical product market advances
wholly appropriable to the individual firm  (Casper 1995: 10)  More distant
supplier relationships lead to the accumulation of fewer relationship specific
assets co-developed with particular suppliers.  This allows final assemblers to
switch between different suppliers on price grounds when changing models.
Furthermore, by asking suppliers to design a spectrum of comparable
components with different performance characteristics, final assemblers can
achieve a high degree of customization.  The configuration of cars with different
module configurations leads to the possibility of thousands of product
variations. JIT delivery is the key to this scheme, as it is the production and
sequencing of component modules with very short ordering times that allows
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buyers to customize their cars or the final assembler to quickly change
production to target shifts in demand or tastes (see Asanuma 1993).
Opel and Volkswagen can pursue the module strategy due to the
availability in Germany in recent years of an ever growing pool of large,
integrated system suppliers.  When Ford and Opel started to implement a new
round of “global sourcing” in the late 1980s, both firms invited their largest, fully-
integrated American suppliers to service their European plants.  For example,
two large American seat manufacturers have in the last five years established
over 40 fully integrated JIT seat plants in Europe, including the plants in
Eisenach and Zwickau.  In addition, there is a group of German companies
which BMW, and to a lesser extent, Mercedes-Benz, worked closely with to
upgrade into full-service suppliers during the 1980s.  When added to the
moderate number of large German companies that have long-established
automotive divisions, such as Bosch, Siemens, or ZF-Friedrichshafen, it is clear
that there is now a large pool of full-service suppliers within Germany.
Full-service suppliers have the resources to establish wholly-dedicated
production sites to meet the product development and JIT delivery needs of
particular final assemblers.  Individual plants are usually very small.  The JIT
seat producers in Eisenach and Zwickau employ less than 45 production
workers per shift.  In probably the most extreme example within Germany, the
large German supplier firm Hella has set up a JIT facility for Volkswagen in
Zwickau that employs only seven workers per shift to assemble the entire front
end of a car (Turner 1994: 56-57).  But these small production sites are backed
up by tremendous corporate resources typically found at the firm's general
headquarters.  This includes research and development facilities, quality-control
and production engineering departments, large financial reserves, and highly
trained management dedicated to large purchasing, engineering, and sales
departments.
The module production approach facilitates simpler risk management
strategies with suppliers.   Instead of sharing risks and monitoring suppliers
privately through technical relationships, final assemblers create a legal
contract delegating risks to either themselves or to suppliers and use public
legal sanctions to enforce the agreement. Because suppliers independently
design components, when product defects occur responsibility can easily be
assigned through determining whether the performance and technical
specifications provided by the final assembler and contained in the contract
were met.  If they are, then the final assembler is responsible, otherwise the
supplier becomes culpable.  Such agreements are common in German industry
and enforceable in German courts (Casper 1996: 20-22).
The VW Golf and Opel Corsa were both established models before
production started in each company’s new production site.  Both VW and Opel8
decided to outsource much more production to suppliers in these new
production sites than in the preexisting plants in Wolfsburg and Russelsheim.
This meant there was little new product development that needed to be carried
out, since reliable existing specifications were provided to suppliers with only
minor modifications for yearly model upgrades.
However, there are two other areas in which substantial risks must be
managed: the adjustment of long-term price clauses and the negotiation of
liability rules for “just in time” delivery.  The next section analyzes in detail the
risk management strategies developed for both areas.   VW and Opel have
whenever possible delegated legal and market risks to suppliers.  Partially as a
result, neither Volkswagen or Opel have engaged in extensive technical
collaboration with their suppliers, even though, as we will see below, JIT
production in particular demands that all suppliers substantially upgrade their
quality management systems.
4.  Risk Management Strategies Used by Opel and  Volkswagen
4.1 Price clauses:
In the car industry both suppliers and final assemblers must make large
investments in product specific capital equipment for each model.  Contracts
with suppliers are signed for the entire model life of the car being produced,
usually 3-5 years.  Suppliers will not commit to making large investments
customized to the needs of a particular customer without a long term contract.
For example, a JIT producer would never build a plant in close proximity to a
final assembler without a long term contract which allows the amortization of
these fixed costs.  However, it is impossible to write fixed price clauses for this
entire time period.  Wage costs change, factor prices fluctuate, plus production
costs usually drop over time due to efficiency gains created by improved work
organization or the incorporation of more advanced capital equipment.  For
these reasons, standard practice with both VW and Opel is design 3-5 year
“framework contracts” that allow for yearly renegotiation of price clauses. The
problem is determining the criteria by which new prices are set.
From the final assembler’s point of view, negotiating price terms is
problematic when suppliers are building unique parts.  Final assemblers must
worry about the supplier taking advantage of private information about its true
costs in order to charge excessive prices.  One reason why many final
assemblers enter into extensive joint product development relationships with
suppliers making unique parts is not just to develop scope economies from9
collaboration, but to be able to monitor that prices charged are justifiable.
However, because the cars being built, the Opel Corsa and VW Golf, are
models being produced at other production sites, both companies as a matter
of policy chose different supplier companies to produce similar parts at each
production site, or produce the parts internally at some locations. This allows
straightforward comparison of prices and promotes competition between
suppliers.  Thus, even though both VW and Opel are “single sourcing,” or using
just one supplier for each component used in their new production chains,
managers at neither firm worry about suppliers charging excessive prices.
The management of supplier companies of both VW and Opel, however,
are very concerned that final assemblers will use flexible price clauses to
opportunistically demand lower prices.  This is especially troublesome once
large capital investments have been made.  Thirteen of the Volkswagen
suppliers and two Opel suppliers have constructed dedicated JIT delivery plants
in Zwickau and Eisenach.  Because these plants cannot easily switch
production to other purposes, they are especially vulnerable to demands that
prices be reduced. (Williamson 1985). Even if this means the plants will be
making a loss, management would be forced to accept demands for lower
prices as long as it is economically better than the next best use.  Short of
shutting down production, most suppliers are helpless against such demands,
even though they sometimes clearly violate German contract law (Martinek
1991).
While price clause adjustments have not been a major issue for Opel
Eisenach suppliers, Volkswagen suppliers in Zwickau have been plagued by
two different problems. First, incomplete price contracts are often exploited
unintentionally, through the final assembler lowering planned production
capacity.  Price bids by suppliers are usually based on an estimate given by the
final assembler of the number of cars it will produce per day.  When it wins the
contract, the supplier either allocates existing capacity or, in the case of most of
the Zwickau and Eisenach suppliers, builds new plant to meet the expected
demand.  The price offered is based on the optimal usage of this capacity.
When the actual volume of orders is lower, costs are usually higher.  This is
due to a combination of factors, such as economies of scale not being met,
redundant labor (which in Germany is very difficult to lay off in the short term),
and learning curves being flatter than expected due to reduced production.
In 1990 VW began production of about 450 cars per day at the old
Sachsen Ring assembly plant.  At the same time VW received massive
subsidies of close to 500 million dollars from the German government and
European Union to build a new factory.  VW announced that by 1993 the new
plant would open with a minimum capacity of 800 cars produced per day, and
the factory was built with a maximum capacity of 1200 per day. Most of the
more sophisticated JIT supplier companies, when building new factories,10
expected this 800 cars per day target to be reached and established its
minimum capacity at this level.
Though construction was finished in 1992, Volkswagen then decided to
delay opening of the new plant by several years, producing just 450 cars per
day at the original factory.  This left many suppliers not just with costly excess
capacity, but also contractually bound to prices based on much higher capacity
utilization.  For most suppliers, reduced production meant economies of scale
would not be reached, making each part more expensive to produce and cutting
profit margins.  Though Volkswagen announced in 1995 that production would
finally begin in 1997, this has recently been called into question due to
demands from the European Union that an additional 100 million dollars in
subsidies provided by the state of Saxony be returned. (Der Spiegel 1996)
Second, final assemblers can also use flexible price clauses to demand
lower prices from suppliers in order to externalize internal cost problems.
Invocation of the now infamous “Lopez clause” in Volkswagen purchasing
contracts is a prime example of this problem.  Particularly during the 1992-1993
period, when Volkswagen was desperate to reduce large loses, the company
complemented internal reorganization with repeated demands that suppliers cut
costs (Handelsblatt 1993).  VW made repeated use of clauses placed in all
contracts by Jose Ignacio Lopez, Volkswagen’s now infamous purchasing
director.  These clauses simply gave VW the right to unilaterally demand lower
prices from suppliers “due to changed market conditions.”   Managers
interviewed at several of the VW suppliers admit to receiving faxes from VW
headquarters in Wolfsburg instituting five percent cuts in price per part,
effective immediately.
In a famous case concerning Mercedes Benz, the German high court ruled
in 1982 that open-ended flexible price clauses are in violation of German
contract law (Martinek 1991).  However, even with this clear legal precedent the
Volkswagen suppliers, including the large dedicated JIT firms, were
defenseless against these demands.  The Golf assembly line at Wolfsburg is
one of VW’s most highly vertically integrated assembly lines.  Seats, wire
assemblies, and other components now routinely subcontracted to specialist
JIT suppliers by most final assemblers are still produced in-house at Wolfsburg
for the Golf.  There was considerable pressure from Wolfsburg to simply ship
these components to the Zwickau site directly from Wolfsburg.  Should
suppliers balk at these unilateral price lowering demands, VW has an extremely
credible threat to simply take production back in-house.   A supplier might win a
legal action, but would assuredly lose the contract.  As a result, supplier firms
have had to cope with the “Lopez clause” as best they can.  Fortunately, since
1993 Volkswagen has tempered its policy of asking for unilateral price
reductions, partly out of concerns that the severity of the price crunch was
causing a decline in quality-control at its suppliers.11
4.2 Liability issues with JIT delivery
Through transporting parts from suppliers directly to the final assembly line as
needed, JIT delivery allows final assemblers to substantially reduce inventory
costs and increase internal plant efficiency and quality levels (Cunsamono
1985; Schonberger 1992). However, the delivery of parts directly to assembly
lines with neither quality-control checks nor large inventories of replacement
parts leads to a number of well known problems.  Some defects, especially
when of a serial nature, can cause production to come to a standstill and, if not
detected before use in assembly, can damage expensive capital equipment
and create extensive re-work costs.  To manage these risks, Opel and
Volkswagen have designed formal contracts assigning responsibility for all
potential liability problems caused by JIT.
JIT contracts are especially interesting in that they have caused a
substantial reshuffling of liability risks as spelled out in normal German
business law.   These laws were designed over a hundred years ago in a very
different industrial world.  Under the old system, in which the final assembler
kept large inventories of thousands of simple parts used in final assembly,
random defects would be found by “entry inspections” legally required to be
carried out by the final assembler when taking delivery of goods (Grunewald
1995).  Suppliers of parts must guarantee the quality of their goods and
immediately replace any parts found defective.  But the law assumes that final
assemblers can easily spot defective parts through simple inspections.
Through requiring these inspections, German law limits the supplier’s exposure
to product liability damages should defective parts cause damages to either the
final assembler or end customers (Ensthaler 1994).
Final assemblers argue that the technological organization of JIT delivery
prevents them from performing normal entry inspections.  This is caused by
both the lack of replacement inventories and the introduction of computer
assisted flexible logistical systems.  For example, Opel’s JIT seat supplier
assembles six different designs for different model versions produced by their
final assembler.  These designs are further customized by the color of
upholstery to match different painting and interior decoration schemes.
Deliveries from the seat producer are synchronized into the exact sequence to
be used in final assembly according to design style and color and delivered less
than four hours before use in production.   Even if normal entry inspections
were possible, any defective seat automatically causes liability problems due to
inevitable production delays and rework costs.
Final assemblers use these arguments to support the introduction of
contractual clauses instituting “exit inspections” to replace the scrutinizing final
assemblers are legally obliged to perform.  Though sensible from a
technological point of view, this switch in business practice carries with it a12
huge redistribution of liability risks away from the final assembler and towards
the supplier. Under the JIT contracts designed by both VW and Opel, suppliers
must assume responsibility for quality control and offer a “zero defect”
guarantee, meaning that they bear full responsibility for any liability damages
caused by their products.
The loss of liability rights is felt immediately by suppliers in the form of
increased premiums for liability insurance.  JIT suppliers must replace
standardized insurance policies, which assume that normal business laws are
used, with customized policies that take into account both the new liability risks
and the ability of the firm to manage the risks through internal quality control
measures.  Such policies are usually more expensive both because of the
increased risk exposure but also because the costs of evaluating the risk profile
of individual companies increases.  Insurers often insist on performing technical
audits to gauge the adequacy of the supplier’s quality management system.
Under normal contracting conditions these audits are not needed, since most
liability risks were minimized by the entry inspections and carried by the final
assembler in cases when they were not carried out.
Similar JIT contracts have since the late 1980s been developed by most
German car assemblers and thus affect virtually every important car parts
supplier nation-wide (Casper 1996: 8-19). Large supplier companies have
accepted these contracts, but only after a number of measures were taken
within national level trade associations to lower the increased insurance costs.
Under JIT contracting final assemblers always conduct audits of a
supplier’s quality control system.  Even if liability risks reside with suppliers, final
assemblers still want to avoid production shutdowns and losses to reputation
caused by defective products.  Over the last several years negotiations within
the national office of the German automobile association (VDA) have been
conducted between large supplier companies and final assemblers to design a
standard set of technical norms specifying an adequate quality control regime
acceptable under JIT production conditions (Casper 1996: 23-24).  These
standards are loosely based on the ISO 9000 based quality control norms first
developed in the United States.  ISO 9000 norms are attractive because the
audit results are easy to understand by third parties.  A separate agreement
was then negotiated between the VDA and the trade association representing
German industrial liability insurers.  This agreement allows auditing results to
be shared with insurers and, if they meet the highest certification levels, to be
used to replace the technical audits normally conducted by insurers.
Furthermore, the German trade association representing liability insurers now
recommends that fee increases be entirely waived when firms have good prior
records and receive top-level certification scores on quality audits.13
Meeting the highest ISO-9000 certification levels involves substantial
reengineering of process organization within the firm, including the introduction
of sophisticated statistical process control schemes. Even though their
assembly plants in Eisenach and Zwickau are small and relatively
unsophisticated in terms of the capital equipment they employ, each of the full-
service JIT suppliers visited were able to receive this top level certification and
avoid higher insurance costs.  In every case firms received extensive aid from
quality control experts located in the company’s corporate headquarters back in
West Germany.  Later we will come back to this point, as the pooling of
important knowledge within private corporate networks instead of within local
para-public institutions is one of the key factors influencing the regional
development of both Eisenach and Zwickau.  But in general, a national-level
solution has been developed that allows sophisticated JIT suppliers to cope
with the increased legal risks
Volkswagen currently has thirteen full-fledged JIT suppliers for the Zwickau
plant while Opel has two. However, both firms have asked all their suppliers to
sign contracts designating them as “JIT” suppliers, complete with abrogations of
traditional entry inspections by final assemblers and the “no defect” guarantee.
Since Opel imports most simple parts from Spain, few local firms are affected.
However, Volkswagen has dozens of suppliers in both Eisenach and Zwickau,
all of which are affected by these legal clauses.  To save on inventory costs,
VW asks for daily or every other day delivery from most suppliers.  But in most
of these cases suppliers are delivering standardized goods in fairly large
quantities.  For example, three of the companies surveyed produce batteries,
lighting fixtures, and stamped parts for the frame of the car.  Each of these
standardized parts producers are contractually designated as JIT suppliers.
These firms are all “second tier” suppliers and none have the computer
controlled flexible procurement systems or synchronized lot deliveries seen with
the full-fledged JIT suppliers.  The primary reason VW designates all firms as
JIT suppliers is because through doing so a substantial part of its liability
burdens can again be shifted over to suppliers.
It is this class of firms that is most directly affected by increased liability
risks and the higher insurance costs. Though all these firms were introducing
quality control schemes based on ISO 9000 standards, in none of the firms
visited were the highest levels of certification demanded by the insurance
companies for waivers of technical audits met.    Industry experts stress that
less than 30% of German supplier firms nationwide have markedly increased
insurance costs due to the new contracts, but also admit that the firms
influenced are usually small and medium sized firms caught in the process of
upgrading (source: interviews at German national insurance association (VDS)).
Overall, the class of companies most in need of insurance protection is least
able to obtain it.14
5.  Can para-public institutions help Mittelstand companies
adopt to the new supplier network strategies?
Even though both the price clause and JIT supplier contracts entail an adoption
of substantial new market and legal risks, all the sophisticated JIT suppliers in
Eisenach and Zwickau have largely accepted these one-sided contractual
arrangements.  Fierce competition in virtually all product market segments
within the car component industry has simply forced many firms to accept the
new state of affairs i¦ order to win contracts.   At least in the short term, these
companies have the financial resources to survive unilateral demands to reduce
prices. Furthermore, as large, sophisticated organizations, these companies
have the resources to make the necessary adaptations to their quality-control
systems in order to accept “zero defect” contracts and assume full liability for
any problems that do occur. Especially in the cases of the two seat producers,
which are American companies, they are used to working in different legal
environments in which contract laws do not exist to protect smaller market
participants.  Accepting full legal liability for every part leaving their factory
doors is part of doing business.
However, a large number of independent small and medium sized suppliers
are caught within a dilemma. Wage competition from Eastern Europe and
elsewhere has essentially closed off market niches for simpler components,
such as stamped parts, that many smaller companies once held.  To win
contracts in currently fiercely competitive automobile parts markets,
manufacturers of simpler parts must make contract bids with very thin profit
margins.  They are thus the first to suffer from unexpected demands to reduce
prices. These firms are typically engaged in the expensive and organizationally
taxing activities of upgrading their capabilities in order to win contracts for
higher value-added component parts.  They are often just developing the
sophisticated quality-control and product development systems needed to
participate in decentralized production arrangements.   Untried and less robust
quality-control systems increase the chance that liability problems will occur.   
However, small, independent suppliers are unlikely to be able to afford liability
insurance, especially when non-standard contractual arrangements increase its
cost.
The question then becomes, are there other resources smaller,
independent suppliers can draw upon to solve these problems? During the
German unification process the institutional system regulating the West
German economy was imported wholesale into East Germany.
3  Chambers of
                                                          
3 In addition to the company interviews, this section draws on interviews with the directors of
Chambers of Commerce and Economic Promotion Offices in Zwickau and Eisenach
conducted in November, 1995 as well as interviews at national offices of the VDMA (machine
tool industry trade association), VDA (automobile industry trade association), both in
Frankfurt, in April, 1995.15
Commerce, private and state-funded research institutes, local offices of trade
associations, and economic promotion offices exist in both Zwickau and
Eisenach.  These institutions oversee the provision of numerous services to
individual firms.  Most important are access to the training system, information
on numerous tax breaks, subsidies, and low interest loans available in Eastern
Germany, access to consulting services provided by the Chamber of
Commerce and local research institutes, and on a very limited scale,
participation in research and development projects sponsored by local
government in conjunction with local technical universities.
Recent research by Gary Herrigel shows that while all local economies in
Germany have a similar set of para-public institutions, only in Baden
Württemberg and a few other areas in Southwestern Germany do firms
collectively use these institutions as an infrastructure to pool research and
development and other collaborative activities (Herrigel 1993, 1995).  Herrigel
(1995) argues that due to highly fractured land ownership patterns and other
unique historical conditions, groups of small textile and metal working firms in
some regions of Southern Germany formed decentralized production
arrangements within local para-public institutions in the 18
th and 19
th century as
an organizational alternative to the large, autonomous firms that came to
dominate the German economy.  Now that firms everywhere are rapidly
decentralizing production due to dramatically increased technological
complexity in most manufacturing industries, the process by which industrial
districts such as those in Baden Württemberg develop has become an
important research topic.
The analysis of supplier network organization strongly predicts that firms
are highly unlikely to pool collaborative engage local para-public institutions in
Eisenach and Zwickau.   If firms do not develop collaborative manufacturing
relationships with each other, seen both by extensive technical cooperation and
the sharing of most market and legal risks, they are unlikely to collectively
engage local para-public institutions.  Numerous other local factors, such as
patterns of civic activity created through the political and economic organization
of the socialist East German state might promote or inhibit patterns of
institutional engagement.  The organization of collaboratory supplier networks is
probably not a sufficient factor, but it is a necessary one for the development of
pooled firm activities within para-public institutions.
To make this argument in more detail, it is worth analyzing an important
example: the development of quality management systems within companies.
This is an obvious area where local para-public institutions could help
independent firms.  Because all suppliers in both regions are contractually
designated as “JIT suppliers,” they all must introduce quality management
systems based on the same ISO 9000 norms. The ISO-9000 norms do not
dictate the precise organization of work or managerial oversight. What they do16
is dictate a number of broad processes that must be integrated into the firm.
These include the inclusion of statistical process controls and the involvement
of both workers and managers in a number of continuous quality oriented
schemes (Paradis and Small, 1996).  At the local level, firms literally need help
redesigning the structure of their organization so as to meet the standards while
remaining efficient manufacturers of their product.
The development of such competencies within local para-public institutions
is possible. National-level standardization makes this an area in which local
para-public institutions could conceivably organize a resource pooling program
modeled after local in technology projects seen elsewhere in German regional
economies (Lutz 1993).  It is clear, however, that for this to work the more
sophisticated local firms would have to join the system and pool their resources.
They would conceivably do this if they expected to receive something in return,
such as access to quality control schemes used by other sophisticated firms, or
if they were collaborating with other firms in the local economy that would
benefit from the program.  In this second case, even if direct benefits were
minimal, gains from the upgrading of other firms would feed back to them in
terms of higher reliability from local suppliers.
There does not exist a coalition of local firms in either Zwickau or Eisenach
with sufficient technical competencies that would benefit from the establishment
of  local cooperative programs in quality control.  As a result no cooperative
programs exist.   Again, the structure of the supplier networks explains why.
The local final assemblers are the best candidates, since they have a direct
interest in assuring that their local suppliers produce high quality parts.
However, both VW and Opel’s quality management programs are directed by
their West German headquarters.  Because both firms have hundreds of
suppliers, systematic help to those not meeting the standards is not provided.
The large, sophisticated JIT supplier firms also are disinterested.  The local
branch factories of these large companies are in fact already members of
extensive cooperative networks to improve their quality management systems,
but these dialogues are structured within private corporate networks.  The
managers in charge of quality control at the local factories of larger firms have
access to managerial experts in implementing quality control systems at
corporate headquarters and also participate in regular information exchanges
with their counterparts at other production locations.  Having already achieved
high-level quality control certification, why risk sharing knowledge with potential
competitors when internal networks achieve many of the possible learning
effects that a local para-public one could generate?
Even though the national harmonization scheme at least provides a single
and relatively stable set of criteria they must meet, independent firms do not
have access to know-how through broader corporate networks.   Partnerships17
with other firms are either very formal, as with the final assemblers, or not
geographically concentrated.  Some of the largest full-service suppliers
regularly enter into their own quality-control dialogues with their suppliers.  For
example, one small local firm visited made specialty parts for and received
quality control help from ZF-Friedrichshafen, a sophisticated producer of
transmissions based in Stuttgart.   But these activities are not systematic or
regionally based.  Most independent firms must develop the new quality control
measures on their own.  The most common source of outside help are private
consultancies, often associated with certification agencies.
6.  Conclusion
It is clear that the organization of supplier networks in Zwickau and Eisenach
regional economies are very different than what is typically seen in West
Germany, and particularly within the industrial districts located in Southern
Germany.  These differences are not caused by the legacy of East Germany’s
45 year experiment with socialist political and economic organization. Instead,
they are explained by a combination of delegated rather than pooled risk
management strategies and hands-off rather than collaborative technical
organization used to organize supplier networks in the two areas.
An important part of the German model is the provision of a wide number of
services to Mittelstand companies through para-public institutions.  The paper
has argued that these institutions work most effectively when they are
collectively engaged by local companies.  Supplier network organization is a
key factor creating the incentives leading to the collective engagement of para-
public institutions.  The vibrancy of many important para-public institutions will
thus be determined in part by the supplier network strategies of large
companies.
Many large German firms, such as BMW, Bosch, Siemens, and ZF-
Friedrichshafen are known for their use of collaborative manufacturing
principles with suppliers.  As each of these firms has adapted well to
competitive challenges of the 1990s, it is possible that the collaborative
manufacturing principles that support collective engagement of para-public
institutions will grow in use.  However, particularly in the automobile industry,
the “module” production system appears to have taken firm root, especially
among volume producers.  Volkswagen, for example, now uses a similar
contractual structure with most suppliers throughout Germany (Casper, 1996).
As the “module” approach to organizing supplier networks is implemented
elsewhere in Germany, these two East German cases might resemble the18
shadow of the future over Western Germany as well, with ominous implications
for the German model of economic organization.19
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